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§5.35

Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege

Although the psychotherapist-patient privilege evolved from the physician-patient privilege, 1 it has now
achieved an independent status and a degree of acceptance exceeding that of its progenitor. 2
The justifications for a psychotherapist-patient privilege are viewed as stronger than those underlying the
physician-patient privilege. 3 A psychotherapist relies almost entirely on disclosures from the client, whereas
the physician often treats injuries or illnesses that can be observed, diagnosed, and treated by procedures not
dependent on patient communications. 4 Matters disclosed in psychotherapy are often more personal and more
likely to cause embarrassment (or potential civil or criminal liability) than matters disclosed to a physician, 5
leading some to conclude that the privilege has a constitutional basis in the right to privacy. 6 Society has an
interest in successful treatment of persons who might pose a danger to the community because of their mental
illness. Persons in need of psychotherapy generally require greater incentive to disclose than persons seeking
medical attention for an injury or illness, 7 and the privilege is intended to serve this instrumental function. 8
§5.35 1. Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 Wayne L. Rev. 175 (1960) (recounting history of
privilege).
2. The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence proposed a psychotherapist-patient privilege but not a physician-patient privilege.
See proposed-but-rejected FRE 504. See also URE 503 (1974) (psychotherapist-patient privilege modeled after proposed-butrejected FRE 504 with state option to extend privilege to physicians).
3. See Louisell, The Psychologist in Today’s Legal World: Part II, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 731, 745 (1957) (because there is “hardly any
situation in the gamut of human relations where one human being is so much subject to the scrutiny and mercy of another human
being as in the psychodiagnostic and psychotherapeutic relationships” it is hard to see how such functions “adequately can be
carried on in the absence of a pervading attitude of privacy and confidentiality”).
4. See Report No. 45, Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry 92 (1960), quoted in ACN, proposed-but-rejected FRE 504
(psychiatrist has a “special need” to maintain confidentiality because his capacity to help his patients “is completely dependent
upon their willingness and ability to talk freely”).
5. See Guttmacher & Weihofen, Psychiatry and the Law 272 (1952) (“The psychiatric patient confides more utterly than anyone
else in the world. He exposes to the therapist not only what his words directly express; he lays bare his entire self, his dreams, his
fantasies, his sins, and his shame. Most patients who undergo psychotherapy know that this is what will be expected of them, and
that they cannot get help except on that condition. . . . It would be too much to expect them to do so if they know that all they
say—and all that the psychotherapist learns from what they say—may be revealed to the whole world from the witness stand.”).
6. See, e.g., Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2007) (defendant’s right to privacy in communications with psychotherapist
are grounded in federal and state constitutions; admitting such communications violated due process); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632,
641 (6th Cir. 1983) (noting that “inability to obtain effective psychiatric treatment may preclude the enjoyment and exercise of
many fundamental freedoms”), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983.
7. See Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (while physical ailments “might be treated with some degree of
effectiveness by a doctor whom the patient did not trust,” a psychiatrist “must have his patient’s confidence or he cannot help
him”).
8. The available data on the extent to which the privilege facilitates psychotherapist-patient communications is based only upon
surveys, and rigorous empirical research has yet to be conducted. See Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and
Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 Yale L.J. 1226, 1255 (1962) (73 percent of
laypersons surveyed believed their communications with a therapist would be inhibited by absence of a privilege); Corcoran, et
al., Absence of Privileged Communications and Its Impact on Air Force Officers, 19 A.F. L. Rev. 51, 56 (1977) (survey showed
most Air Force officers preferred civilian to military psychiatrists, primarily for the reason that there is no privilege under military
law). But see Shuman & Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60

All 50 states recognize some form of psychotherapist-patient privilege, 9 often based on proposed-butrejected FRE 504 or URE 503. 10
Federal privilege recognized
In the landmark decision of Jaffe v. Redmond, 11 the Supreme Court held that confidential communications
between a licensed psychotherapist and her patients in the course of diagnosis or treatment are protected from
compelled disclosure under FRE 501. The Court concluded on the basis of “reason and experience” that such
a privilege “promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence.” 12 The
Court was persuaded that if the privilege were rejected, confidential conversations between psychotherapists
and clients “would surely be chilled,” particularly where it was foreseeable that such statements might be used
in litigation. 13 Because the types of statements most useful in litigation, such as incriminating admissions by
a patient, would probably not be made in absence of a privilege, it was thought unlikely that recognition of
the privilege would cause a significant loss of evidence. 14 Jaffee was a breakthrough decision not only in
recognizing the psychotherapist-patient privilege as a matter of federal privilege law (prior authority on point
was very sparse), but in drawing heavily on the privilege law of Illinois (where the Jaffee suit was brought) in
fleshing out the substance of the federal privilege, apparently recognizing the value of the extensive experience
behind state privilege law in shaping federal law.
Social workers
The Jaffee decision goes beyond proposed-but-rejected FRE 504 and the law in a number of states by
extending the psychotherapist-patient privilege to licensed social workers as well as licensed psychiatrists and
psychologists. 15 The Court found that the reasons for recognizing the privilege apply with equal force to social

N.C. L. Rev. 893, 924-925 (1982) (concluding from a research study that patients rely primarily on medical Code of Ethics to
protect confidentiality and that “patients are probably not deterred from seeking psychiatric help to any significant degree” by
absence of the privilege); Imwinkelried, The Rivalry Between Truth and Privilege: The Weakness of the Supreme Court’s
Instrumental Reasoning in Jaffee v. Redmond, 49 Hastings L.J. 969 (1998) (arguing that instrumentalist justification for privilege
has not been made and privilege should rest on right of privacy).
9. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12 n.11 (1996) (listing state provisions). Such state provisions must be followed in federal
proceedings where state law supplies the rule of decision. See Haney v. Mizell Memorial Hosp., 744 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1984).
See generally §5.7, supra.
10. See 13A U.L.A. 1 (listing states adopting URE 503).
11. 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996).
12. Id. at 9-10.
13. Id. at 11-12.
14. Id. See generally Mueller, The Federal Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege After Jaffe: Truth and Other Values in a Therapeutic
Age, 49 Hastings L.J. 947, 955-957 (1998) (although Jaffe may be criticized as overbroad or too narrow, decision merits respect
as “a compromise between functionality and precision”).
15. See, e.g., proposed-but-rejected FRE 504(a)(2) (limiting definition of “psychotherapist” to persons “authorized to practice
medicine” and licensed or certified psychologists). Courts disagree over extending the privilege to communications with
unlicensed counselors. Compare Oleszko v. State Compensation Insurance Fund, 243 F.3d 1154, 1157-1158 (9th Cir. 2001)
(extending privilege to unlicensed counselors employed by Employee Assistance Programs) with United States v. Dunham, 93 F.
Supp. 3d 1291, 1295 (W.D. Okla. 2015) (adopting a “bright-line” rule requiring licensure for privilege to apply).

workers, at least when they are engaged in psychotherapy rather than other types of social services. 16 However,
given the wide variation in state licensing standards for social workers, the persons protected by this new
privilege may differ significantly in education, training and qualifications.
The privilege applies only to communications, although some state courts have defined “communications”
broadly. 17 The communications must be made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of the patient’s mental
or emotional condition. 18 The communications must be made in confidence, which means that unprivileged
third parties cannot be present, although the presence of others who are participating in the diagnosis or
treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist does not destroy confidentiality. 19 The privilege does not
attach to communications by a patient, such as threats of violence, where the psychotherapist has informed
the patient in advance that such communications will be reported to proper authorities. 20
Scope
Marital counseling normally involves a significant emotional component making it subject to the privilege,
but vocational and educational counseling generally do not. Although some courts have held that the privilege
does not protect the identity of the client or the fact of consultation, 21 the privacy interests of the client would
seem to justify such protection. 22
The privilege extends to preliminary communications made for the purpose of establishing a
psychotherapist-patient relationship, even where no such relationship is actually formed, provided the
psychotherapist has indicated an apparent willingness to enter such a relationship. 23 At least one court has
16. The Court noted that social workers provide a significant amount of mental health treatment to poor clients or clients of
modest means and found no public purpose to be served by drawing a distinction “between the counseling provided by costly
psychotherapists and the counseling provided by more readily accessible social workers.” 518 U.S. at 17.
17. See In re Doe, 98 N.M. 442, 649 P.2d 510, 514-515 (1982) (protected communications to psychotherapists include not only
verbal communications, but information derived from observation and personal examination of patient and inferences and
conclusions drawn therefrom).
18. See proposed-but-rejected FRE 504(b).
19. Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 718 (7th Cir. 2006) (relatives of plaintiff in sexual harassment suit, who were present
and involved in her psychological evaluation, may intervene to ask court to exclude records pertaining to them). See also
proposed-but-rejected FRE 504(a)(3); Cross, Privileged Communications between Participants in Group Psychotherapy, 1970 L.
& Soc. Order 191. But see United States v. Bolander, 722 F.3d 199, 223 (4th Cir. 2013) (any privilege prisoner held in connection
with therapists’ reports generated during federal sex offender treatment program was waived when he voluntarily provided reports
to expert for use in evaluating his mental condition in connection with civil commitment proceedings).
20. United States v. Auster, 517 F.3d 312, 316-317 (5th Cir. 2008) (application of psychotherapist-patient privilege requires
reasonable expectation of confidentiality; privilege was unavailable to defendant where defendant had been informed that
therapist had duty under state law to disclose defendant’s report that he would seek “violent retribution” against those whom he
believed withheld his workers’ compensation benefits and nonetheless chose to inform therapist of his plan).
21. See In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 640 (6th Cir. 1983) (as general rule, “identity of a patient or the fact and time of his treatment
does not fall within the scope of the psychotherapist-patient privilege”), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983.
22. See Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 586-587 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (often it is identity “that patients generally wish to have
shielded from exposure”). See generally Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 Wayne L. Rev. 175,
188 (1960) (it is “vital to maintain confidentiality as to the fact of treatment” or a person “may hesitate to visit a psychiatrist out of
fear that he will be set apart from his fellow men”); Note, The Case for a Federal Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege That Protects
Patient Identity, 1985 Duke L.J. 1217.
23. State v. Miller, 300 Or. 203, 709 P.2d 225, 234-236 (1985) (inculpatory statements made by defendant on telephone to
receptionist and psychiatrist at state hospital were privileged even though psychiatrist testified that she was not intending to

held that the privilege applies when the patient reasonably but mistakenly believes that she was being
counseled by a licensed psychotherapist. 24
The privilege normally covers persons either assisting the psychotherapist or reasonably necessary for the
transmission of communications between the patient and psychotherapist. 25 In addition, the privilege applies
to persons who are present to further the interests of the patient, such as family members participating in the
treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist. 26
The Jaffee decision rejected the argument that the privilege should have a balancing component, because
making the promise of confidentiality contingent on a later evaluation by the trial judge of the relative
importance of patient privacy against a party’s need for the evidence “would eviscerate the effectiveness of
the privilege.” 27 Nonetheless, the Court indicated that there should be some exceptions to the privilege, 28
citing specifically the situation where “a serious threat of harm to the patient or to others can be averted only
by means of a disclosure by the therapist.” 29 Interestingly, proposed-but-rejected FRE 504 does not contain a
future crime or tort exception, seemingly adopting the view that there is less danger of such threats being
carried out if patients are allowed the freedom to vent their angers and discuss their criminal intentions with a
psychotherapist. The courts are divided on whether a future crime exception should be recognized as a matter
of federal common law. 30 Some courts hold that even if a psychotherapist has a duty to warn a potential
victim, 31 it does not follow that the threatening statement by the patient is admissible in a later criminal
provide psychotherapy and was interrogating defendant to hold him until police could arrive at pay phone where he placed the
call), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141.
24. Speaker v. County of San Bernardino, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1112 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (privilege applies even though mental
health therapist was not licensed to give the type of care involved here, where client reasonably believed that therapist had the
necessary license).
25. See State v. Miller, 300 Or. 203, 709 P.2d 225, 235-236 (1985) (privilege applied to defendant’s murder confession made to
receptionist over telephone while seeking to talk with a psychiatrist at state mental hospital; receptionist asked defendant to
describe his problem before she would refer him to a psychiatrist), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141. But see United States v. Ghane,
673 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012) (privilege did not cover statements to emergency room physician’s assistant performing hospital
intake interview for patient seeking psychiatric treatment for suicidal ideation; “passing intake information along in a chart does
not suffice as treatment”).
26. See proposed-but-rejected FRE 504(a)(3).
27. 518 U.S. at 17 (quoting an earlier statement in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) that “[a]n uncertain
privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no
privilege at all.”). See In re Sealed Case (Medical Records), 381 F.3d 1205, 1213-1214 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (federal psychotherapistpatient privilege is absolute and not subject to balancing).
28. Id. at n.19 (although it is unnecessary and premature to delineate the full contours of the privilege, “we do not doubt that there
are situations in which the privilege must give way”).
29. Id.
30. Compare United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 992 (9th Cir. 2003) (declining to recognize “dangerous patient” exception;
exception would “significantly injure” interests justifying privilege, have “little practical advantage,” “encroach significantly” on
policy prerogatives of states, and “go against the experience” of all but one state in Ninth Circuit, as well as the Proposed Rules)
and United States v. Ghane, 673 F.3d 771, 784-785 (8th Cir. 2012) (rejecting “dangerous patient” exception; treating psychiatrist
should not have been allowed to testify about defendant’s confidential communications) with In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 183
F.3d 71, 74-78 (1st Cir. 1999) (crime-fraud exception applies to psychotherapist-patient privilege). See
generally Daniel M. Buroker, The Psychotherapist-Patient Exception and Post-Jaffee Confusion, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 1373 (2004).
31. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, 340 (1976) (psychotherapist may be
subject to tort liability for failure to warn potential victims of such threats). See generally Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing

prosecution (in effect, the privilege may still apply in this setting). 32 Some courts focus on whether the patient
was told that threatening statements would be outside the privilege, 33 while others focus on whether the threats
are sufficiently serious. 34
An exception to the privilege is generally recognized for court-ordered examinations, although the judge
has discretion to limit disclosure and maintain the privilege. 35 Generally such examinations would not be
subject to the privilege in any case because their results are to be reported to the court and parties, thereby
negating the requirement of confidentiality. An exception is also usually recognized in proceedings to
hospitalize the patient for mental illness. 36
The privilege does not apply where the patient or someone acting on his behalf relies upon her mental or
emotional condition as an element of a claim or defense. 37 However, the privilege is lost only with respect to
communications bearing on the particular mental condition at issue. 38
Placing mental condition at issue
There is a division of authority on the question whether parties place their mental condition at issue in
proceedings to determine child custody, with some courts upholding the privilege 39 but others taking the
Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 358 (1976).
32. United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2000) (exception to confidentiality and privilege are not co-extensive;
psychotherapist who complies with duty to warn is still entitled to invoke testimonial privilege in later criminal proceeding against
patient).
33. United States v. Auster, 517 F.3d 312, 315-320 (5th Cir. 2008) (patient had no reasonable expectation of confidentiality where
psychotherapist had informed patient repeatedly that any violent threats would be communicated to potential victims).
34. See United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 1998) (defendant convicted for making threats against President, which
were reported to Secret Service by his psychiatrist; trial judge rejected psychotherapist-patient privilege claim relying on future
crimes exception; appellate court remands for determination of whether threat sufficiently serious to vitiate privilege and whether
its disclosure “was the only means of averting harm to the President”).
35. Proposed-but-rejected FRE 504(d)(2) (“If the judge orders an examination of the mental or emotional condition of the patient,
communications made in the course thereof are not privileged under this rule with respect to the particular purpose for which the
examination is ordered unless the judge orders otherwise.”). The use of statements made by a defendant in the course of a courtordered examination is often restricted by statute or rule. See, e.g., FRCrimP 12.2(c) (“No statement made by the defendant in the
course of any examination provided for by this rule, whether the examination be with or without the consent of the defendant, no
testimony by the expert based upon such statement, and no other fruits of the statement shall be admitted in evidence against the
defendant in any criminal proceeding except on an issue respecting mental condition on which the defendant has introduced
testimony.”). Cf. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-463 (1981) (criminal defendant has constitutional right not to answer
questions at court-ordered examination where answers may be used against defendant at sentencing hearing).
36. Proposed-but-rejected FRE 504(d)(1).
37. Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2000) (in suit claiming mental and emotional damages from sex
discrimination and harassment, plaintiff put psychological condition in issue, hence waived privilege). But see In re Sims, 534
F.3d 117, 134 (2d Cir. 2008) (plaintiff does not forfeit privilege by asserting claim for injuries that do not include emotional
damage, nor by stating that he suffers condition such as depression for which he does not seek damages; plaintiff may withdraw or
formally abandon claims for emotional distress to avoid forfeiting privilege); Langenfeld v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 299
F.R.D. 547, 553 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (a plaintiff who limits claims to “garden variety” emotional injuries of only a short-term nature
does not waive privilege, but plaintiff sought relief for ongoing and serious emotional disturbance; privilege waived).
38. Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844, 862-864, 574 P.2d 766, 777-779, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695, 706-708 (1978).
39. Navarre v. Navarre, 191 Mich. App. 395, 479 N.W.2d 357, 358-359 (1991) (legislature did not intend to suspend medical

position that the privilege must yield in order to determine the “best interests” of the child, 40 at least where
the mental health of a party is clearly in controversy41 or circumstances indicate abuse or neglect. 42 Some
courts hold that a patient’s mental condition is placed at issue when evidence about such condition is necessary
for a fair response to an issue raised by the patient. 43
When a defendant in a criminal case enters an insanity plea or advances some other defense based on mental
condition, many courts conclude that doing so waives a claim privilege for communications to all
psychotherapists consulted on the condition, 44 although some authorities hold that that waiver occurs only
when defendant introduces testimony on the mental condition. 45
Child abuse reporting laws
Today many states have laws requiring psychotherapists and other professionals to report child abuse.
Although generally these reporting requirements override the psychotherapist-patient privilege, 46 careful
examination of the statutory scheme is necessary because a reporting law occasionally may require disclosure
to a public official without abrogating the privilege of the patient to prevent the psychotherapist from testifying
in a judicial proceeding. 47
Like other privileges, the psychotherapist-patient privilege can be overridden where necessary to protect a
defendant’s right of confrontation, as happens where psychiatric history tends directly to impeach a
prosecution witness. 48
privilege in custody disputes); Peisach v. Antuna, 539 So. 2d 544, 546 (Fla. App. 1989) (wife’s denials of husband’s allegations
that she was mentally unfit to be custodial parent did not place her mental health in issue or “eviscerate” privilege).
40. In re M.M., 569 A.2d 463, 465 (Vt. 1989) (one who “seeks to resist action by the State to terminate his or her parental rights
over a child places his or her mental health in issue”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1059.
41. Matter of Von Goyt, 461 So. 2d 821, 823 (Ala. 1984) (where mental state of party in a custody suit “is clearly in controversy”
and a proper resolution of custody issue requires disclosure of privileged medical records, “psychologist-patient privilege must
yield.”).
42. See generally Slovenko, Child Custody and the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 19 J. Psych. & Law 163 (Spring-Summer
1991).
43. See, e.g., Flora v. Hamilton, 81 F.R.D. 576, 579-580 (M.D.N.C. 1978) (by challenging discharge from employment, plaintiff
waived psychotherapist-patient privilege on issue of “ability to work in a structured institution”). But see In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117,
134 (2d Cir. 2008) (party’s privilege is not overcome when other party puts his mental state in issue).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752, 753 (5th Cir. 1976) (claim of psychotherapist-patient privilege cannot be
asserted “when the defendant in a criminal trial claims insanity as a defense”), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853. But a psychotherapist
who was retained by the defense attorney to examine the client may also be covered by the attorney-client privilege as a
“representative of the lawyer.” See §5.10, supra. On whether such a psychotherapist can be called as a prosecution witness, see
§5.30, supra.
45. See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. §40.280 (1991).
46. See, e.g., Del. R. Evid. 503(d)(4) (1991); Wis. Stat. Ann. §905.04(4)(e) (1993). See generally Smith, Medical and
Psychotherapy Privileges and Confidentiality: On Giving with One Hand and Removing with the Other, 75 Ky. L.J. 473 (1987).
47. Cf. United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 579 (6th Cir. 2000) (suggesting similar result under federal caselaw). Mosteller,
Child Abuse Reporting Laws and Attorney-Client Confidences: The Reality and Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42 Duke L.J.
203, 230 (1992).
48. In re Doe, 964 F.2d 1325, 1328 (2d Cir. 1992) (precluding inquiry into psychiatric history of prosecution witness would
violate defendant’s constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses). See generally §5.5, supra.

